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SECURITIES-Plaintiff's Recovery in Private Suit Based
on Violation of Federal Securities Laws Held Barred by
Defenses of In Pari Delicto or Unclean Hands.
Albert E. Kuehnert brought an action under section 27 of the Se-
curities and Exchange Act of 19341 against Texstar Corporation and its
former president William T. Rhame. Kuehnert sought damages for
losses he suffered as a result of an alleged violation of section 10(b)
of the Securities and Exchange Act, and Rule 1Ob-5 of the Securities
and Exchange Commission promulgated pursuant to the Act.2
In January, 1965, Kuehnert was informed by Rhame, a personal
friend, that Texstar was engaged in confidential negotiations with
Coronet Petroleum Company, and that these negotiations would result
in the acquisition by Texstar of Coronet's assets, including certain val-
uable oil and gas leases. Rhame further indicated that he had con-
cluded agreements with Humble Oil and Refining Company and Tex-
aco, Inc. which provided for these firms to take farmouts of the land
acquired from Coronet for the drilling of oil and gas wells. He also
told Kuehnert that Texstar would receive substantial profits from these
activities resulting in a sharp rise in the price of Texstar stock, and that
the earnings from the current fiscal year would be $3.00 per share.3
Relying on this information,4 Kuehnert purchased 94,600 shares of
Texstar stock largely on margin. Later, primarily because Rhame's
alleged representations' concerning the "farmouts" proved untrue,
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1965).
2. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1969). The rule provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security."
3. Texstar stock was registered on the American Stock Exchange and was then
selling for approximately $4.25 per share.
4. Rhame had allegedly urged Kuehnert to buy large blocks of stock in the hope
that they could together acquire a "working control" of the corporation. It seems pos-
sible that if Rhame did engage in the activities alleged, he may have intended to inflate
the price of Texstar stock to enhance chances of the merger with Coronet. There
are indications that Rhame's policies had been opposed by other members of Texstar's
management.
5. Rhame denied making the representations alleged.
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Kuehnert lost his entire investment.
The trial court granted summary judgment for all the defendants,
holding that section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 were intended to protect
ordinary investors buying on general information, and would not
support a cause of action by one dealing on the basis of confidential
corporate information.6 The court indicated alternatively, that plaintiffs
recovery would be barred by the affirmative defense of in pari delicto.7
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed
the decision, one judge dissenting. In affirming, the court of appeals
relied primarily on the alternative ground suggested by the district
court. They held that plaintiff's recovery was barred either by the doc-
trine of "unclean hands" or because he was in pari delicto with the de-
fendant. 8
Judge Godbold, in his dissenting opinion, indicated that the applica-
tion of the common law defenses of in pari delicto and unclean hands
to private actions based upon the federal securities laws was improper,
particularly in the absence of authorization of these defenses by the
statute. He argued that by applying these defenses the court was un-
dermining the public policy that private actions based upon section
10(b) promote the public interest because they are an effective en-
forcement device to insure rigid adherence to the provisions of the Act.
The decision in Kuehnert seems significant primarily because it is the
first instance in which a court of appeals has ruled on the applicability of
the defenses of in pari delicto or "unclean hands" in an action arising
under section 10(b) of Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. It is also
significant that the court ruled on the applicability of these defenses on
the basis of the facts as plaintiff believed them to be, not as they were
ultimately proved at trial.'
DID KUEHNERT'S CONDUCT VIOLATE RULE 1 Ob-5
Both the district court and the court of appeals found that the plain-
tiff had violated Rule 1Ob-5 although he had made no affirmative
6. Kuehnert v. Texstar, 286 F. Supp. 340, 345 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
7. Id. at 345. The court did not reach the defense of Texstar that Rhame had
been acting for his own interests, and not within the scope of his corporate au-
thority.
8. Kuehnert v. Texstar, 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969). The court did indicate,
however, that, since Kuehnert himself was duped by Rhame, he was probably not in
pari delicto as to intention with Rhame.
9. That is, the court barred Kuehnert's recovery because of his failure to disclose
confidential information which had been revealed to him by Rhame, notwithstanding
the fact that the information was false, and consequently Kuehnert's failure to disclose
it occasioned harm to no one.
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misrepresentations relating to the securities involved, and he was not an
officer, director, employee, or majority shareholder of Texstar Corpora-
tion.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's finding that Kuehnert
had an affirmative duty to disclose the confidential information he had
received from Rhame to those parties from whom he purchased Texstar
stock. This holding seems to be consistent with other recent 1Ob-5
cases. In In Re Cady, Roberts & Co.,' ° the S.E.C. held that a stock
broker who had received confidential information from a corporate di-
rector had the same duty to disclose that information to his vendees, as
the director himself would.
Ross v. Licht" applied the rule established in Cady, Roberts to hold
"tippees"" liable for trading on the basis of confidential information
without disclosing that information.
The decision in Kuehnert extends the trend evidenced by these de-
cisions and seems to solidify the proposition that one who knowingly
trades on the basis of information which is both confidential and ma-
terial' has an affirmative duty to disclose that information, and failure
to do so will result in a violation of Rule 1Ob-5.
In light of this trend, the only question as to whether Kuehnert did
violate Rule 1Ob-5 revolves around the fact that the information he
possessed was untrue, and thus resulted in no harm to the sellers with
whom he dealt.14  The question thus presented seems to be whether
non-disclosure of information which was in fact untrue, though ma-
terial according to the various court enunciated tests, will constitute a
violation of Rule lOb-5.
The precise question thus presented does not seem to have been pre-
10. 40 SEC 907 (1961), 61-64 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 76, 803 (1961).
11. 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D. N.Y. 1967).
12. Ross v. Licht seems to be the first case to have coined this phrase to denote
those who, though not technically corporate insiders, have had access to confidential
corporate information. The "tippees" in Ross were friends and relatives of directors
of the corporation. The court in Ross indicated, alternatively, that the "tippees" were
liable for aiding and abetting a violation of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.
13. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965). Only material in-
formation need be disclosed. The materiality of the statements which Kuehnert failed
to disclose was not raised on appeal, however. Kuehnert v. Texstar, supra, note 8 at
701. The court in Ross v. Licht described a material fact as "one to which a reason-
able man would attach importance in determining his choice whether to make the sale
or not." 263 F. Supp., at 408.
14. The mere fact that no person suffered economic harm as a result of plaintiff's
conduct, and therefore no private cause of action accrued as a result thereof, would
not seem to preclude the possibility of a violation of Rule lOb-5. It is possible that
such conduct could validly give rise to a proceeding by the S.E.C., and therefore re-
sult in a determination that the conduct was, in fact, illegal.
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viously litigated, but the decision in Kuehnert appears reasonable. Kue-
hmert's conduct was in fact a purposeful attempt to defraud his vendors,
and it was only because Kuehnert himself was being defrauded that
his purpose was not fulfilled. Such conduct is precisely the type of
activity that the Rule was designed to prevent, and should fall within
the purview of Rule lOb-5. x5
THE DOCTRINE OF UNCLEAN HANDS AND IN PARI DELICTO
Unclean hands is a doctrine which bars relief to a plaintiff who has
acted inequitably or in bad faith in the matter in which he seeks re-
covery.16  The doctrine is equitable in nature and was originally
grounded in the historical concept of a court of equity as a vehicle for
affirmatively enforcing the requirements of conscience and good faith1 7
Historically, it has not usually been applied in actions for damages.' 8
However, prior to Kiefer Stewart v. Seagrams19 one area in which the
doctrine had been effectively used to preclude damage actions by plain-
tiffs was anti-trust treble damage litigation.20 Private antitrust actions,
like actions based on violations of section 10(b), arise as a result of
alleged violations of a federal statute.2 1 Consequently, the policy un-
derlying these two categories of actions, that they provide an effective
vehicle for the enforcement of the respective statutes involved, 22 is
quite similar. Thus, decisions in anti-trust cases involving related issues
15. The fact situation presented here is, admittedly, a unique one. However, sec-
tion (3) of the Rule would seem sufficiently broad to encompass Kuehnert's actions.
It prohibits engaging in "any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security." (Emphasis added). This section thus appears to reach even
those activities which have not been successfully concluded.
16. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., 324
U.S. 806, 814 (1945).
17. Id.
18. 30 C.J.S. Equity § 98 at 1038 n.1 (1965). It has been suggested that even in
an equitable action the defense of unclean hands can not be applied where the trans-
action involves a violation of a statute if the legislative purpose would not be furthered
by the application of the defense. Id. at 1036-37.
19. 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
20. See Comment, 54 Nw. U.L. REv. 456 (1959).
21. The basis of the cause of action is, however, somewhat different. § 4 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1965), explicitly provides that private individuals shall
have a cause of action for damages suffered as a result of a violation of the anti-trust
laws. No such provision is applicable to violations of section 10(b). However, the
courts have implied the existence of civil liability for violation of this section. Bren-
nan v. Midwestern Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966); cf. J.I. Case
v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
22. Perma Life Mufflers v. International Parts, 392 U.S. 134, 138 (1968); J.I.
Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964). Another policy is, of course, compensation
of injured parties for the losses suffered as a result of these violations. The general
purpose of the antitrust statute is the promotion of competition so as to protect the
public interest; this is not dissimilar to that of the securities laws, protection of the
public and investors.
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can probably be afforded substantial weight in attempting to resolve
similar questions in private securities litigation.
23
The use of the defense of unclean hands in anti-trust litigation might
have lent support to the propriety of its application in securities cases.
However, in Kiefer-Stewart the United States Supreme Court held that
conduct of the plaintiff which allegedly violated the Sherman Act did
not preclude its recovery of treble damages because of similar but un-
related conduct by the defendant. Although the Court did not refer to
the term "unclean hands" in denying recovery, it would seem that the
Court effectively rejected the principle upon which the doctrine was
based.24  Thus, any previous authority derived from anti-trust cases
relative to the application of "unclean hands" has been severely eroded.
The doctrine of in pari delicto, literally meaning of equal fault, is
applied when both the plaintiff and defendant have participated in the
same illegal conduct. It precludes plaintiffs recovery for any damages
suffered as a result of this conduct. Pari delicto has traditionally been
available both at law and in equity, and it has been used often in private
anti-trust suits. However, its use has been somewhat limited by two
recent Supreme Court cases. In Simpson v. Union Oil Co.25 the Court
refused to deny the plaintiff relief in a treble damage anti-trust action
merely because he could have elected not to deal with a supplier, thus
avoiding the necessity of entering into an illegal agreement. 26 Simp-
son has been cited as strengthening the business necessity exception to
the defense of pari delicto.27  Thus, although the plaintiff technically
entered the agreement voluntarily, he was coerced to do so by com-
pelling business reasons.2
Following Simpson, the Court recently decided Perma Life Mufflers
v. International Parts.29 In Perma Life the Supreme Court reversed the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit which had granted a summary
23. In fact, Judge Godbold's dissent in Kuehnert was based primarily upon recent
anti-trust decisions which expressed policies which he felt were equally applicable to
securities litigation.
24. In Kiefer-Stewart the plaintiffs allegedly illegal conduct was completely unre-
lated to that of the defendant. Thus, since in pari delicto is generally applied only
when the parties have jointly entered into an illegal course of dealing, it would seem
that the case involves 'unclean hands". Inferentially, then, the continued viability of
"unclean hands" in treble damage cases seems to be under attack in this case.
25. 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
26. Since both the plaintiff and the defendant were parties to the same agreement
this case has often been interpreted as dealing with the defense of in pari delicto, al-
though the Court did not use that term.
27. 57 ILL. BAR JOURNAL 413, 415 (1969).
28. That is, if he failed to agree to the illegal terms of the contract he would
have been denied completely the Union Oil franchise he desired.
29. 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
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judgment for the defendant on the ground that plaintiffs conduct
placed it in pari delicto with the defendant, and thus barred its re-
covery.30  Justice Black, writing the opinion of the Court,3 1 appeared
to reject entirely the applicability of in pari delicto as a defense to anti-
trust violations on the basis that public policy was best served by en-
couraging private suits. 32  However, five members of the Court failed
to concur in this opinion. Justice White agreed that the concept of pari
delicto was not particularily useful in private anti-trust litigation, but he
would replace it with the doctrine of substantial causation. 3 Justices
Fortas and Marshall, while concurring in result, argued that pari delicto
should be retained as an affirmative defense, at least in those situations
where the plaintiff was an active party to the agreement and had not
been subjected to coercive force on the part of the defendant.
Synthesizing the various opinions in Perma Life is rather difficult but
seems to yield the impression that where the plaintiff has actively and
purposefully engaged in conduct leading to the furtherance of the illegal
act, he will be denied recovery. This was the interpretation of Perma
Life advanced by the court in the recent case of Premier Electric Co. v.
Miller-Davis.3" There the court denied recovery to the plaintiff in a
treble damage suit because of his participation in an alleged bid-rigging
scheme. In applying Perma Life to that case, the court said:
Thus, in each of the five opinions in the case, the door was left
open for a limited application of a defense of illegality in civil
antitrust actions. The distinctions drawn throughout the various
opinions are particularly relevant here. Premier is not a mere
participant or unwilling victim of the transaction out of which the
case arose. Rather, Premier was an originating, moving, active
and aggressive party to the illegal bidrigging scheme. There is no
indication that the Supreme Court sought to protect a plaintiff so
30. Perma Life Mufflers v. International Parts Corp., 376 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1967).
31. Only three members of the Court concurred in this opinion. Justices White,
Fortas, and Marshall wrote separate concurring opinions, and Justice Harlan dissented
in an opinion in which Justice Stewart concurred.
32. Although it is not clear even under the authority of Justice Black's opinion that
the plaintiff's conduct will never bar his recovery, for he stated:
"We need not decide, however, whether such truly complete involvement and
participation in a monopolistic scheme could ever be a basis, wholly apart
from the idea of pari delicto, for barring a plaintiff's cause of action." Perma
Life, supra note 28, at 140.
33. Thus, the plaintiff could not recover unless the defendant's conduct had been a
substantial cause of his injury. In those instances in which the plaintiff had not been
coerced into accepting the illegal agreement, but was an active co-conspirator, this
element would not be present and recovery would be barred. It seems this concept is
still close to the concept of pari delicto accepted by some of the other members of the
Court.
34. 1969 CCH TRADE CASES Par. 72, 710.
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intensely involved in an illegal restrain on trade.35
In light of recent developments it appears that the Court has rejected
the theory that any wrongdoing on the part of a plaintiff in relation to
the matter being litigated will bar his recovery. However, they seem to
have retained a limited version of in pari delicto as a defense to private
antitrust litigation.
In analyzing the plaintiff's conduct in Kuehnert, it seems clear that
he could correctly be described as having "unclean hands", as he at-
tempted to perpetrate a fraud upon his vendors. It is less clear
whether he could be accurately characterized as being in pari delicto
with the defendant. If Kuehnert's conduct is analyzed from his sub-
jective point of view,36 he actively engaged in illegal conduct in concert
with Rhame. Indeed, if Kuehnert's stock purchase had resulted in
economic loss to his vendors, Rhame would seem to have been jointly
and severally liable to those parties for aiding and abetting Kuehnert's
1Ob-5 violation. 7  Moreover, Rhame's violation of Section 10(b) and
Rule 1 Ob-5 seems to arise primarily because of Kuehnert's transactions,
for without them, the purchase and sale which is a prerequisite to finding
a 1 Ob-5 violation would not have been present.38
However, even if a plaintiffs conduct is deemed to have established
"unclean hands" or pari delicto, the question still remains as to whether
it should bar the maintenance of a private damage action.
SHOULD UNCLEAN HANDS OR IN PARI DELICTO BAR RECOVERY
IN A PRIVATE ACTION UNDER SECTION 10 (b)
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act does not explicitly pro-
vide a private cause of action for damages resulting from a violation of
its terms. The right to maintain such an action, however, has been
implied judicially. 39  It might be argued that because the cause of ac-
35. Premier, supra note 34, at 86,540. The court seemed to recognize that what
was being applied was a test of substantial illegality, whatever its name, when it said
". .. (W)e sanction the defense of illegality, call it in pari delicto if you will, in
these circumstances...." Id.
36. The court seems to have done this, although it recognized that Kuehnert and
Rhame could not technically "be seen as in pari delicto even as to intentions."
Kuehnert, supra, note 8, at 704. Thus, since Kuehnert and Rhame had different sub-jective intentions (Rhame's apparently being to defraud Kuehnert) it could be argued
that they were not engaged in the same conduct, and that in pari delicto would not
apply.
37. Cf. Pettit v. American Stock Exchange, 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); An-
derson v. Dupont, 291 F. Supp. 705 (D. Minn. 1968).
38. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Co., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).
39. See note 20, supra. One rationale that has been advanced to support the find-
ing is that a violation of a statute which enunciates the legislative purpose of protecting
certain rights gives rise to a cause of action in tort for the violation of the statutory
duty thus created.
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tion is derived from a statutory duty, any affirmative defense which
might conflict with the underlying Congressional purpose should not be
available.4" However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Royal
Air v. Smith has held that because private actions arising under section
10(b) had originally been judicially implied, common law defenses
should be available. 4' Notwithstanding the Smith decision, it would
seem unwise to apply an affirmative defense to an action based upon a
violation of a statutory duty where that application would severaly un-
dermine the basic policy of the statute.
In Kuehnert, the court indicated that application of the defenses of
unclean hands or in pari delicto rested within the discretion of the court,
and should be governed by the underlying policy of the securities laws. 42
In determining how to best effectuate the policy of the act, the court
indicated that it was extremely important to discourage a "tippee" from
trading on the basis of confidential information. If such a party were
allowed to recover from his "tippor" he would have, in effect, "an en-
forceable warranty that secret information is true."43  If the information
is false he could recover from the insider, and if it is true he will prob-
ably have profitted from the stock transaction itself.44
Against this consideration, the court weighed the fact that to deny
Kuehnert recovery would fail to discourage Rhame's conduct. It de-
termined that the overall policy of the act would best be served by
denying Kuehnert recovery, notwithstanding the fact that Rhame was
the original cause of the disclosure of the confidential information.
This decision does not seem unreasonable in light of the fact that an
insider, such as Rhame, remains open to action by the Securities Ex-
change Commission, would be jointly liable with the "tippee" for any
40. See note 18, supra.
41. 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962). The defenses involved were those of waiver
and estoppel.
42. Kuehnert, supra note 8, at 704. The basic policy of the Act is, of course,
protection of the investing public.
43. Id. at 705.
44. The tippee would, of course, be liable to those he dealt with, but this liability
might never be discovered. The court in Royal Air v. Smith, supra note 41, at 213-
214, in discussing an analogous problem, said:
The purpose of the Securities Exchange Act is to protect the innocent investor,
not one who loses his innocence and then waits to see how his investment
turns out before he decides to invoke the provisions of the Act."
This introduces a very interesting question which was not treated by the Court of
Appeals in Kuehnert, but which represented the primary rationale for the District
Court decision. The District Court held that section 10(b )was intended to protect
general investors, not those acting on the basis of confidential information, and would
not support a cause of action by a "tippee." There is little authority on this question,
but the theory, if it has any validity at all, adds weight to the policy considerations
tending to indicate recovery should be denied to a "tippee".
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harm occasioned by the "tippee's" transactions and is primarily liable
for any damages resulting from his own purchases or sales."
CONCLUSION
The fact situation presented in Kuehnert v. Texstar is admittedly an
unique one. In this regard the court's decision to view the plaintiffs
conduct from the standpoint of his subjective belief, without regard to
the objective validity of the information he possessed, seems reasonable
in light of the broad protective purposes of section 1 0(b).
The court's broad application of "unclean hands" or in pari delicto
as a defense to a private 1Ob-5 action may be unwise.4" The policy
considerations involved, while varying to some degree, are similar to
those contained in the application of these defenses in private anti-trust
actions.4 7 As previously indicated the United States Supreme Court has
apparently rejected unclean hands as a defense to these actions.4" How-
ever, it does seem that a limited version of pari delicto, possibly in
the form of a substantial illegality test, is still viable in the anti-trust
cases.49 It is submitted that application of a similar test would be pre-
ferable to the broad holding of the court of appeals in Kuehnert. In
any case, it seems clear that some of the questions raised by this decision,
like many others in the field of securities law generally, are badly in
need of clarification by the Supreme Court.
JILL DEVITT
45. Even if unclean hands or pari delicto is applied to private 10b-5 actions, they
would, of course, have no effect on a proceeding by the S.E.C. Moreover, Rhame
would seem jointly liable with Kuehnert for aiding and abetting a lOb-5 violation. See
note 36, supra and accompanying text. The strongest policy argument against the ac-
tion taken by the Kuehnert court may be that by allowing the action Rhame's conduct
is publicized and that by discouraging "tipping" at its initial source, among corporate
officials, indirect effects of the initial disclosure will be prevented.
46. Partcularly where, as here, the court indicated that application of the defenses
rests within the discretion of the court. It would seem that if the plaintiff's conduct
justifies a denial of recovery in one instance, similar conduct should be treated in the
same manner.
47. Actually, the policy of private enforcement seems stronger in anti-trust cases
because private actions are explicitly sanctioned by section 4 of the Clayton Act, and
treble damages are allowed.
48. See note 24, supra.
49. See notes 32-34, supra, and accompanying text.
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